The remote Fedora 38 host has a package installed that is affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the FEDORA-2023-9f5f1ef40a advisory.

  - HashiCorp Consul and Consul Enterprise up to 1.11.8, 1.12.4, and 1.13.1 do not check for multiple SAN URI     values in a CSR on the internal RPC endpoint, enabling leverage of privileged access to bypass service     mesh intentions. Fixed in 1.11.9, 1.12.5, and 1.13.2. (CVE-2022-40716)

  - Parsing malicious or large YAML documents can consume excessive amounts of CPU or memory. (CVE-2022-3064)

  - containerd is an open source container runtime. A bug was found in containerd prior to versions 1.6.18 and     1.5.18 where supplementary groups are not set up properly inside a container. If an attacker has direct     access to a container and manipulates their supplementary group access, they may be able to use     supplementary group access to bypass primary group restrictions in some cases, potentially gaining access     to sensitive information or gaining the ability to execute code in that container. Downstream applications     that use the containerd client library may be affected as well. This bug has been fixed in containerd     v1.6.18 and v.1.5.18. Users should update to these versions and recreate containers to resolve this issue.
    Users who rely on a downstream application that uses containerd's client library should check that     application for a separate advisory and instructions. As a workaround, ensure that the `USER $USERNAME`     Dockerfile instruction is not used. Instead, set the container entrypoint to a value similar to     `ENTRYPOINT [su, -, user]` to allow `su` to properly set up supplementary groups. (CVE-2023-25173)

  - BuildKit is a toolkit for converting source code to build artifacts in an efficient, expressive and     repeatable manner. In affected versions when the user sends a build request that contains a Git URL that     contains credentials and the build creates a provenance attestation describing that build, these     credentials could be visible from the provenance attestation. Git URL can be passed in two ways: 1)     Invoking build directly from a URL with credentials. 2) If the client sends additional version control     system (VCS) info hint parameters on builds from a local source. Usually, that would mean reading the     origin URL from `.git/config` file. When a build is performed under specific conditions where credentials     were passed to BuildKit they may be visible to everyone who has access to provenance attestation.
    Provenance attestations and VCS info hints were added in version v0.11.0. Previous versions are not     vulnerable. In v0.10, when building directly from Git URL, the same URL could be visible in `BuildInfo`     structure that is a predecessor of Provenance attestations. Previous versions are not vulnerable. This bug     has been fixed in v0.11.4. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may disable VCS info     hints by setting `BUILDX_GIT_INFO=0`. `buildctl` does not set VCS hints based on `.git` directory, and     values would need to be passed manually with `--opt`. (CVE-2023-26054)

  - Consul and Consul Enterprise allowed an authenticated user with service:write permissions to trigger a     workflow that causes Consul server and client agents to crash under certain circumstances. This     vulnerability was fixed in Consul 1.14.5. (CVE-2023-0845)

  - Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,     Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component     (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby, is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is     compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a     simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and     supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated     virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is     an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag     the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the     overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful     when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by     encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in     Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional     properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and     confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby     installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These     rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a     VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without     interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. Two iptables rules serve to filter     incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted     datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been     previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby     sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should     have been discarded. The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A     sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container's outbound     gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond     simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network. Patches are available in Moby releases     23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of     that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default,     UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet injection, and/or     ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster. (CVE-2023-28840)

  - Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,     Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component     (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is     compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a     simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and     supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated     virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is     an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag     the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating     overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted     mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
    Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec     Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted     overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data     integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an     encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both     incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32`     kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced     on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. An     iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay     network for IPsec encapsulation. Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit     unencrypted data. As a result, `overlay` networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as     expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees. It is possible for     an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is     moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because     many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may     use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is     no longer guaranteed. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container     Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some     workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the     Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet,     and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.
    (CVE-2023-28841)

  - Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,     Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component     (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is     compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a     simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and     supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated     virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is     an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag     the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating     overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted     mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
    Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec     Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted     overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data     integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an     encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both     incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32`     kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced     on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The     `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each     node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for     destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay     networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to     communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the     VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into     the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be     quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available     in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered     differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-     node clusters, deploy a global pause' container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a     single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same     connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented     using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode     (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay     networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.
    (CVE-2023-28842)

  - HashiCorp Consul 1.8.1 up to 1.11.8, 1.12.4, and 1.13.1 do not properly validate the node or segment names     prior to interpolation and usage in JWT claim assertions with the auto config RPC. Fixed in 1.11.9,     1.12.5, and 1.13.2. (CVE-2021-41803)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The remote Fedora 39 host has a package installed that is affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the FEDORA-2023-b9c1d0e4c5 advisory.

  - HashiCorp Consul and Consul Enterprise up to 1.11.8, 1.12.4, and 1.13.1 do not check for multiple SAN URI     values in a CSR on the internal RPC endpoint, enabling leverage of privileged access to bypass service     mesh intentions. Fixed in 1.11.9, 1.12.5, and 1.13.2. (CVE-2022-40716)

  - Parsing malicious or large YAML documents can consume excessive amounts of CPU or memory. (CVE-2022-3064)

  - containerd is an open source container runtime. A bug was found in containerd prior to versions 1.6.18 and     1.5.18 where supplementary groups are not set up properly inside a container. If an attacker has direct     access to a container and manipulates their supplementary group access, they may be able to use     supplementary group access to bypass primary group restrictions in some cases, potentially gaining access     to sensitive information or gaining the ability to execute code in that container. Downstream applications     that use the containerd client library may be affected as well. This bug has been fixed in containerd     v1.6.18 and v.1.5.18. Users should update to these versions and recreate containers to resolve this issue.
    Users who rely on a downstream application that uses containerd's client library should check that     application for a separate advisory and instructions. As a workaround, ensure that the `USER $USERNAME`     Dockerfile instruction is not used. Instead, set the container entrypoint to a value similar to     `ENTRYPOINT [su, -, user]` to allow `su` to properly set up supplementary groups. (CVE-2023-25173)

  - BuildKit is a toolkit for converting source code to build artifacts in an efficient, expressive and     repeatable manner. In affected versions when the user sends a build request that contains a Git URL that     contains credentials and the build creates a provenance attestation describing that build, these     credentials could be visible from the provenance attestation. Git URL can be passed in two ways: 1)     Invoking build directly from a URL with credentials. 2) If the client sends additional version control     system (VCS) info hint parameters on builds from a local source. Usually, that would mean reading the     origin URL from `.git/config` file. When a build is performed under specific conditions where credentials     were passed to BuildKit they may be visible to everyone who has access to provenance attestation.
    Provenance attestations and VCS info hints were added in version v0.11.0. Previous versions are not     vulnerable. In v0.10, when building directly from Git URL, the same URL could be visible in `BuildInfo`     structure that is a predecessor of Provenance attestations. Previous versions are not vulnerable. This bug     has been fixed in v0.11.4. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may disable VCS info     hints by setting `BUILDX_GIT_INFO=0`. `buildctl` does not set VCS hints based on `.git` directory, and     values would need to be passed manually with `--opt`. (CVE-2023-26054)

  - Consul and Consul Enterprise allowed an authenticated user with service:write permissions to trigger a     workflow that causes Consul server and client agents to crash under certain circumstances. This     vulnerability was fixed in Consul 1.14.5. (CVE-2023-0845)

  - Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,     Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component     (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby, is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is     compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a     simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and     supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated     virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is     an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag     the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the     overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful     when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by     encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in     Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional     properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and     confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby     installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These     rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a     VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without     interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. Two iptables rules serve to filter     incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted     datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been     previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby     sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should     have been discarded. The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A     sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container's outbound     gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond     simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network. Patches are available in Moby releases     23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of     that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default,     UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet injection, and/or     ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster. (CVE-2023-28840)

  - Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,     Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component     (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is     compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a     simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and     supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated     virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is     an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag     the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating     overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted     mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
    Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec     Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted     overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data     integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an     encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both     incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32`     kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced     on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. An     iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay     network for IPsec encapsulation. Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit     unencrypted data. As a result, `overlay` networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as     expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees. It is possible for     an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is     moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because     many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may     use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is     no longer guaranteed. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container     Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some     workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the     Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet,     and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.
    (CVE-2023-28841)

  - Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,     Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component     (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is     compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a     simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and     supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated     virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is     an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag     the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating     overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted     mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
    Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec     Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted     overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data     integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an     encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both     incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32`     kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced     on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The     `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each     node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for     destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay     networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to     communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the     VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into     the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be     quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available     in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered     differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-     node clusters, deploy a global pause' container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a     single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same     connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented     using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode     (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay     networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.
    (CVE-2023-28842)

  - HashiCorp Consul 1.8.1 up to 1.11.8, 1.12.4, and 1.13.1 do not properly validate the node or segment names     prior to interpolation and usage in JWT claim assertions with the auto config RPC. Fixed in 1.11.9,     1.12.5, and 1.13.2. (CVE-2021-41803)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

An update of the consul package has been released.

The remote Fedora 37 host has a package installed that is affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the FEDORA-2023-cf3551046d advisory.

  - HashiCorp Consul and Consul Enterprise up to 1.11.8, 1.12.4, and 1.13.1 do not check for multiple SAN URI     values in a CSR on the internal RPC endpoint, enabling leverage of privileged access to bypass service     mesh intentions. Fixed in 1.11.9, 1.12.5, and 1.13.2. (CVE-2022-40716)

  - Parsing malicious or large YAML documents can consume excessive amounts of CPU or memory. (CVE-2022-3064)

  - containerd is an open source container runtime. A bug was found in containerd prior to versions 1.6.18 and     1.5.18 where supplementary groups are not set up properly inside a container. If an attacker has direct     access to a container and manipulates their supplementary group access, they may be able to use     supplementary group access to bypass primary group restrictions in some cases, potentially gaining access     to sensitive information or gaining the ability to execute code in that container. Downstream applications     that use the containerd client library may be affected as well. This bug has been fixed in containerd     v1.6.18 and v.1.5.18. Users should update to these versions and recreate containers to resolve this issue.
    Users who rely on a downstream application that uses containerd's client library should check that     application for a separate advisory and instructions. As a workaround, ensure that the `USER $USERNAME`     Dockerfile instruction is not used. Instead, set the container entrypoint to a value similar to     `ENTRYPOINT [su, -, user]` to allow `su` to properly set up supplementary groups. (CVE-2023-25173)

  - BuildKit is a toolkit for converting source code to build artifacts in an efficient, expressive and     repeatable manner. In affected versions when the user sends a build request that contains a Git URL that     contains credentials and the build creates a provenance attestation describing that build, these     credentials could be visible from the provenance attestation. Git URL can be passed in two ways: 1)     Invoking build directly from a URL with credentials. 2) If the client sends additional version control     system (VCS) info hint parameters on builds from a local source. Usually, that would mean reading the     origin URL from `.git/config` file. When a build is performed under specific conditions where credentials     were passed to BuildKit they may be visible to everyone who has access to provenance attestation.
    Provenance attestations and VCS info hints were added in version v0.11.0. Previous versions are not     vulnerable. In v0.10, when building directly from Git URL, the same URL could be visible in `BuildInfo`     structure that is a predecessor of Provenance attestations. Previous versions are not vulnerable. This bug     has been fixed in v0.11.4. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may disable VCS info     hints by setting `BUILDX_GIT_INFO=0`. `buildctl` does not set VCS hints based on `.git` directory, and     values would need to be passed manually with `--opt`. (CVE-2023-26054)

  - Consul and Consul Enterprise allowed an authenticated user with service:write permissions to trigger a     workflow that causes Consul server and client agents to crash under certain circumstances. This     vulnerability was fixed in Consul 1.14.5. (CVE-2023-0845)

  - Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,     Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component     (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby, is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is     compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a     simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and     supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated     virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is     an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag     the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the     overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful     when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by     encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in     Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional     properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and     confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby     installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These     rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a     VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without     interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. Two iptables rules serve to filter     incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted     datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been     previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby     sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should     have been discarded. The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A     sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container's outbound     gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond     simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network. Patches are available in Moby releases     23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of     that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default,     UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet injection, and/or     ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster. (CVE-2023-28840)

  - Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,     Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component     (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is     compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a     simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and     supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated     virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is     an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag     the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating     overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted     mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
    Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec     Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted     overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data     integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an     encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both     incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32`     kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced     on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. An     iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay     network for IPsec encapsulation. Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit     unencrypted data. As a result, `overlay` networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as     expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees. It is possible for     an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is     moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because     many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may     use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is     no longer guaranteed. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container     Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some     workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the     Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet,     and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.
    (CVE-2023-28841)

  - Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker,     Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component     (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is     compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a     simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and     supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated     virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is     an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag     the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating     overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted     mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
    Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec     Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted     overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data     integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an     encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both     incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32`     kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced     on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The     `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each     node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for     destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay     networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to     communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the     VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into     the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be     quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available     in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered     differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-     node clusters, deploy a global pause' container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a     single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same     connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented     using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode     (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay     networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.
    (CVE-2023-28842)

  - HashiCorp Consul 1.8.1 up to 1.11.8, 1.12.4, and 1.13.1 do not properly validate the node or segment names     prior to interpolation and usage in JWT claim assertions with the auto config RPC. Fixed in 1.11.9,     1.12.5, and 1.13.2. (CVE-2021-41803)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

ID	名前	製品	ファミリー	公開日	更新日	深刻度
180265	Fedora 38 : moby-engine (2023-9f5f1ef40a)	Nessus	Fedora Local Security Checks	2023/8/30	2023/8/30	high
185286	Fedora 39 : moby-engine (2023-b9c1d0e4c5)	Nessus	Fedora Local Security Checks	2023/11/7	2023/11/7	high
180494	Fedora 37: moby-engine (2023-cf3551046d)	Nessus	Fedora Local Security Checks	2023/9/5	2023/9/5	high
180265	Fedora 38 : moby-engine (2023-9f5f1ef40a)	Nessus	Fedora Local Security Checks	2023/8/30	2023/8/30	high
185286	Fedora 39 : moby-engine (2023-b9c1d0e4c5)	Nessus	Fedora Local Security Checks	2023/11/7	2023/11/7	high
203591	Photon OS 5.0: Consul PHSA-2023-5.0-0053	Nessus	PhotonOS Local Security Checks	2024/7/23	2024/7/23	high
180494	Fedora 37 : moby-engine (2023-cf3551046d)	Nessus	Fedora Local Security Checks	2023/9/5	2023/9/5	high

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