Linux/Unix 主機上安裝了一個或多個受到弱點影響的套件，且廠商未提供可用的修補程式。

  - drm/amdgpu：拒絕將保留的門鈴對應至新佇列 建立使用者佇列時，使用者空間會提供門鈴 BO 控點，以及 bo 內的位移，以取得門鈴。然而，目前的實作使用 xa_store_irq（） 來儲存門鈴，這允許使用相同的 BO 和偏移參數建立的稍後佇列來覆蓋現有佇列和門鈴映射。這可能會導致諸如將柵欄 IRQ 處理錯誤路由到錯誤佇列等問題，並誤導一個佇列的清理過程清除另一個佇列的對應。此提交透過將 xa_store_irq 替換為 xa_insert_irq 來解決此問題，拒絕將保留的門鈴對應到新建立的佇列 （從提交 6244eae22966350db52faf9c1369d3b2ffc5de4e 中挑選） （CVE-2026-68103）

請注意，Nessus 的判定取決於廠商所報告的套件是否存在。

遠端 CentOS Linux 9 主機上安裝的套件受到 kernel-5.14.0-756.el9 版本變更記錄中提及的多個弱點影響。

  - 已解決 Linux 核心中的下列弱點：wifi: cfg80211: bound element ID read when checking non-inheritance cfg80211_is_element_inherited() reads the first data octet of the candidate element (id = elem->data[0]) to look it up in an extension non-inheritance list. It does so after testing elem->id, but without verifying that the element actually has a data octet. A zero-length extension element (WLAN_EID_EXTENSION with length 0) therefore makes it read one octet past the end of the element.
    _ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() runs this check for every element of a frame once a non-inheritance context exists -- e.g. while parsing a per-STA profile of a Multi-Link element in a (re)association response, or a non-transmitted BSS profile -- so a crafted frame from an AP can trigger a one-octet slab-out-of-bounds read during element parsing: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_is_element_inherited Read of size 1 ... in net/wireless/scan.c Return early (treat the element as inherited) when an extension element carries no data, mirroring the existing handling of empty ID lists. The bug was found by fuzzing ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() under KASAN. (CVE-2026-68402)

  - 已解決 Linux 核心中的下列弱點：RDMA/siw: Reject MPA FPDU length underflow before signed receive math A malicious connected siw peer can send an iWARP FPDU whose MPA length field (c_hdr->mpa_len, 16 bit big-endian, peer-controlled) is smaller than the fixed DDP/RDMAP header for the announced opcode. Soft-iWARP parses the full header in siw_get_hdr() based on iwarp_pktinfo[opcode] .hdr_len, but never compares mpa_len against that header length. siw_tcp_rx_data() then derives srx->fpdu_part_rem = be16_to_cpu(mpa_len) - fpdu_part_rcvd + MPA_HDR_SIZE; where fpdu_part_rcvd equals iwarp_pktinfo[opcode].hdr_len at this point. For a tagged WRITE (hdr_len 16, MPA_HDR_SIZE 2) the smallest on-wire mpa_len of 0 yields fpdu_part_rem = -14, and any mpa_len below hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE underflows to a negative int. The signed value then flows into siw_proc_write()/siw_proc_rresp() as bytes = min(srx->fpdu_part_rem, srx->skb_new); is handed to siw_check_mem() as an int len (whose interval check addr + len > mem->va + mem->len is satisfied for a valid base when len is negative), and reaches siw_rx_data() -> siw_rx_kva() / siw_rx_umem() -> skb_copy_bits() as a signed copy length. The header copy branch in skb_copy_bits() promotes that to size_t, producing a multi-gigabyte read. KASAN under a KUnit harness that drives the real kernel TCP receive path -- a loopback AF_INET socketpair, the malformed FPDU written via kernel_sendmsg, sk_data_ready firing in softirq, tcp_read_sock dispatching to siw_tcp_rx_data -- reports: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_copy_bits+0x284/0x480 Read of size 4294967295 at addr ffff888... Call Trace:
    skb_copy_bits siw_rx_kva siw_rx_data siw_check_mem siw_proc_write siw_tcp_rx_data __tcp_read_sock siw_qp_llp_data_ready tcp_data_ready tcp_data_queue Add the missing invariant at the earliest point where the peer header is fully assembled. iwarp_pktinfo[*].hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE is exactly the value the siw transmitter uses as the minimum mpa_len for each opcode (drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp.c:33), so this matches the protocol contract. Out-of-range FPDUs terminate the connection with TERM_ERROR_LAYER_LLP / LLP_ETYPE_MPA / LLP_ECODE_FPDU_START -- which is RFC 5044 Section 8 error code 3 (Marker and ULPDU Length fields do not agree on the start of an FPDU), the correct framing-error class for this inconsistency.
    (CVE-2026-64102)

  - 已解決 Linux 核心中的下列弱點：RDMA/rxe: Fix race condition in QP timer handlers I encontered the following warning: WARNING: drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_task.c:249 at rxe_sched_task+0x1c8/0x238 [rdma_rxe], CPU#0: swapper/0/0 ... libsha1 [last unloaded: ip6_udp_tunnel] CPU:
    0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G C 6.19.0-rc5-64k-v8+ #37 PREEMPT Tainted: [C]=CRAP Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.2 Call trace: rxe_sched_task+0x1c8/0x238 [rdma_rxe] (P) retransmit_timer+0x130/0x188 [rdma_rxe] call_timer_fn+0x68/0x4d0 __run_timers+0x630/0x888 ... WARNING:
    drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_task.c:38 at rxe_sched_task+0x1c0/0x238 [rdma_rxe], CPU#0: swapper/0/0 ...
    WARNING: drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_task.c:111 at do_work+0x488/0x5c8 [rdma_rxe], CPU#3:
    kworker/u17:4/93400 ... refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: lib/refcount.c:28 at refcount_warn_saturate+0x138/0x1a0, CPU#3: kworker/u17:4/93400 The issue is caused by a race condition between retransmit_timer() and rxe_destroy_qp, leading to the Queue Pair's (QP) reference count dropping to zero during timer handler execution. It seems this warning is harmless because rxe_qp_do_cleanup() will flush all pending timers and requests. Example of flow causing the issue: CPU0 CPU1 retransmit_timer() {spin_lock_irqsave rxe_destroy_qp() __rxe_cleanup() __rxe_put() // qp->ref_count decrease to 0 rxe_qp_do_cleanup() { if (qp->valid) { rxe_sched_task() { WARN_ON(rxe_read(task->qp) <= 0); } } spin_unlock_irqrestore } spin_lock_irqsave qp->valid = 0 spin_unlock_irqrestore } Ensure the QP's reference count is maintained and its validity is checked within the timer callbacks by adding calls to rxe_get(qp) and corresponding rxe_put(qp) after use. (CVE-2026-45910)

  - 已解決 Linux 核心中的下列弱點：ext4: fix e4b bitmap inconsistency reports A bitmap inconsistency issue was observed during stress tests under mixed huge-page workloads.
    Ext4 reported multiple e4b bitmap check failures like: ext4_mb_complex_scan_group:2508: group 350, 8179 free clusters as per group info. But got 8192 blocks Analysis and experimentation confirmed that the issue is caused by a race condition between page migration and bitmap modification. Although this timing window is extremely narrow, it is still hit in practice: folio_lock ext4_mb_load_buddy __migrate_folio check ref count folio_mc_copy __filemap_get_folio folio_try_get(folio) ...... mb_mark_used ext4_mb_unload_buddy
    __folio_migrate_mapping folio_ref_freeze folio_unlock The root cause of this issue is that the fast path of load_buddy only increments the folio's reference count, which is insufficient to prevent concurrent folio migration. We observed that the folio migration process acquires the folio lock. Therefore, we can determine whether to take the fast path in load_buddy by checking the lock status. If the folio is locked, we opt for the slow path (which acquires the lock) to close this concurrency window. Additionally, this change addresses the following issues: When the DOUBLE_CHECK macro is enabled to inspect bitmap-related issues, the following error may be triggered: corruption in group 324 at byte 784(6272): f in copy != ff on disk/prealloc Analysis reveals that this is a false positive. There is a specific race window where the bitmap and the group descriptor become momentarily inconsistent, leading to this error report:
    ext4_mb_load_buddy ext4_mb_load_buddy __filemap_get_folio(create|lock) folio_lock ext4_mb_init_cache folio_mark_uptodate __filemap_get_folio(no lock) ...... mb_mark_used mb_mark_used_double mb_cmp_bitmaps mb_set_bits(e4b->bd_bitmap) folio_unlock The original logic assumed that since mb_cmp_bitmaps is called when the bitmap is newly loaded from disk, the folio lock would be sufficient to prevent concurrent access. However, this overlooks a specific race condition: if another process attempts to load buddy and finds the folio is already in an uptodate state, it will immediately begin using it without holding folio lock. (CVE-2026-45942)

  - 已解決 Linux 核心中的下列弱點：RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used. However, payload_size() subtracts both the attacker-controlled BTH pad field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt->paylen: payload_size = pkt->paylen - offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt) - RXE_ICRC_SIZE This means a short packet can still make payload_size() underflow even if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring header_size(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave payload_size() negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users. Fix this by validating pkt->paylen against the full minimum length required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE. (CVE-2026-46043)

請注意，Nessus 並未測試這些問題，而是僅依據應用程式自我報告的版本號碼作出判斷。

Linux/Unix 主机中安装的一个或多个程序包受到一个漏洞影响，而供应商没有提供补丁程序。

  - drm/amdgpu：拒绝将预留的门铃映射到新队列 创建用户队列时，用户空间会提供门铃 BO 句柄和 BO 内的偏移量以获取门铃。但是，当前的实现使用 xa_store_irq（） 来存储门铃，这允许使用相同的 BO 和 offset 参数创建的后续队列覆盖现有队列和门铃映射。这可能导致诸如错误路由隔离 IRQ 处理到错误队列之类的问题，并误导一个队列的清理进程擦除另一个队列的映射。此提交通过将 xa_store_irq 替换为 xa_insert_irq 修复了此问题，拒绝将预留的门铃映射到新创建的队列（从提交 6244eae22966350db52faf9c1369d3b2ffc5de4e 中CVE-2026-68103精选出的内容）（）

请注意，Nessus 依赖供应商报告的程序包是否存在进行判断。

远程 CentOS Linux 9 主机上安装的多个程序包受到 kernel-5.14.0-756.el9 版本变更日志中提及的多个漏洞影响。

  - 已修复 Linux 内核中的下列漏洞：wifi: cfg80211: bound element ID read when checking non-inheritance cfg80211_is_element_inherited() reads the first data octet of the candidate element (id = elem->data[0]) to look it up in an extension non-inheritance list. It does so after testing elem->id, but without verifying that the element actually has a data octet. A zero-length extension element (WLAN_EID_EXTENSION with length 0) therefore makes it read one octet past the end of the element.
    _ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() runs this check for every element of a frame once a non-inheritance context exists -- e.g. while parsing a per-STA profile of a Multi-Link element in a (re)association response, or a non-transmitted BSS profile -- so a crafted frame from an AP can trigger a one-octet slab-out-of-bounds read during element parsing: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_is_element_inherited Read of size 1 ... in net/wireless/scan.c Return early (treat the element as inherited) when an extension element carries no data, mirroring the existing handling of empty ID lists. The bug was found by fuzzing ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() under KASAN. (CVE-2026-68402)

  - 已修复 Linux 内核中的下列漏洞：RDMA/siw: Reject MPA FPDU length underflow before signed receive math A malicious connected siw peer can send an iWARP FPDU whose MPA length field (c_hdr->mpa_len, 16 bit big-endian, peer-controlled) is smaller than the fixed DDP/RDMAP header for the announced opcode. Soft-iWARP parses the full header in siw_get_hdr() based on iwarp_pktinfo[opcode] .hdr_len, but never compares mpa_len against that header length. siw_tcp_rx_data() then derives srx->fpdu_part_rem = be16_to_cpu(mpa_len) - fpdu_part_rcvd + MPA_HDR_SIZE; where fpdu_part_rcvd equals iwarp_pktinfo[opcode].hdr_len at this point. For a tagged WRITE (hdr_len 16, MPA_HDR_SIZE 2) the smallest on-wire mpa_len of 0 yields fpdu_part_rem = -14, and any mpa_len below hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE underflows to a negative int. The signed value then flows into siw_proc_write()/siw_proc_rresp() as bytes = min(srx->fpdu_part_rem, srx->skb_new); is handed to siw_check_mem() as an int len (whose interval check addr + len > mem->va + mem->len is satisfied for a valid base when len is negative), and reaches siw_rx_data() -> siw_rx_kva() / siw_rx_umem() -> skb_copy_bits() as a signed copy length. The header copy branch in skb_copy_bits() promotes that to size_t, producing a multi-gigabyte read. KASAN under a KUnit harness that drives the real kernel TCP receive path -- a loopback AF_INET socketpair, the malformed FPDU written via kernel_sendmsg, sk_data_ready firing in softirq, tcp_read_sock dispatching to siw_tcp_rx_data -- reports: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_copy_bits+0x284/0x480 Read of size 4294967295 at addr ffff888... Call Trace:
    skb_copy_bits siw_rx_kva siw_rx_data siw_check_mem siw_proc_write siw_tcp_rx_data __tcp_read_sock siw_qp_llp_data_ready tcp_data_ready tcp_data_queue Add the missing invariant at the earliest point where the peer header is fully assembled. iwarp_pktinfo[*].hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE is exactly the value the siw transmitter uses as the minimum mpa_len for each opcode (drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp.c:33), so this matches the protocol contract. Out-of-range FPDUs terminate the connection with TERM_ERROR_LAYER_LLP / LLP_ETYPE_MPA / LLP_ECODE_FPDU_START -- which is RFC 5044 Section 8 error code 3 (Marker and ULPDU Length fields do not agree on the start of an FPDU), the correct framing-error class for this inconsistency.
    (CVE-2026-64102)

  - 已修复 Linux 内核中的下列漏洞：RDMA/rxe: Fix race condition in QP timer handlers I encontered the following warning: WARNING: drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_task.c:249 at rxe_sched_task+0x1c8/0x238 [rdma_rxe], CPU#0: swapper/0/0 ... libsha1 [last unloaded: ip6_udp_tunnel] CPU:
    0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G C 6.19.0-rc5-64k-v8+ #37 PREEMPT Tainted: [C]=CRAP Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.2 Call trace: rxe_sched_task+0x1c8/0x238 [rdma_rxe] (P) retransmit_timer+0x130/0x188 [rdma_rxe] call_timer_fn+0x68/0x4d0 __run_timers+0x630/0x888 ... WARNING:
    drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_task.c:38 at rxe_sched_task+0x1c0/0x238 [rdma_rxe], CPU#0: swapper/0/0 ...
    WARNING: drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_task.c:111 at do_work+0x488/0x5c8 [rdma_rxe], CPU#3:
    kworker/u17:4/93400 ... refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: lib/refcount.c:28 at refcount_warn_saturate+0x138/0x1a0, CPU#3: kworker/u17:4/93400 The issue is caused by a race condition between retransmit_timer() and rxe_destroy_qp, leading to the Queue Pair's (QP) reference count dropping to zero during timer handler execution. It seems this warning is harmless because rxe_qp_do_cleanup() will flush all pending timers and requests. Example of flow causing the issue: CPU0 CPU1 retransmit_timer() {spin_lock_irqsave rxe_destroy_qp() __rxe_cleanup() __rxe_put() // qp->ref_count decrease to 0 rxe_qp_do_cleanup() { if (qp->valid) { rxe_sched_task() { WARN_ON(rxe_read(task->qp) <= 0); } } spin_unlock_irqrestore } spin_lock_irqsave qp->valid = 0 spin_unlock_irqrestore } Ensure the QP's reference count is maintained and its validity is checked within the timer callbacks by adding calls to rxe_get(qp) and corresponding rxe_put(qp) after use. (CVE-2026-45910)

  - 已修复 Linux 内核中的下列漏洞：ext4: fix e4b bitmap inconsistency reports A bitmap inconsistency issue was observed during stress tests under mixed huge-page workloads.
    Ext4 reported multiple e4b bitmap check failures like: ext4_mb_complex_scan_group:2508: group 350, 8179 free clusters as per group info. But got 8192 blocks Analysis and experimentation confirmed that the issue is caused by a race condition between page migration and bitmap modification. Although this timing window is extremely narrow, it is still hit in practice: folio_lock ext4_mb_load_buddy __migrate_folio check ref count folio_mc_copy __filemap_get_folio folio_try_get(folio) ...... mb_mark_used ext4_mb_unload_buddy
    __folio_migrate_mapping folio_ref_freeze folio_unlock The root cause of this issue is that the fast path of load_buddy only increments the folio's reference count, which is insufficient to prevent concurrent folio migration. We observed that the folio migration process acquires the folio lock. Therefore, we can determine whether to take the fast path in load_buddy by checking the lock status. If the folio is locked, we opt for the slow path (which acquires the lock) to close this concurrency window. Additionally, this change addresses the following issues: When the DOUBLE_CHECK macro is enabled to inspect bitmap-related issues, the following error may be triggered: corruption in group 324 at byte 784(6272): f in copy != ff on disk/prealloc Analysis reveals that this is a false positive. There is a specific race window where the bitmap and the group descriptor become momentarily inconsistent, leading to this error report:
    ext4_mb_load_buddy ext4_mb_load_buddy __filemap_get_folio(create|lock) folio_lock ext4_mb_init_cache folio_mark_uptodate __filemap_get_folio(no lock) ...... mb_mark_used mb_mark_used_double mb_cmp_bitmaps mb_set_bits(e4b->bd_bitmap) folio_unlock The original logic assumed that since mb_cmp_bitmaps is called when the bitmap is newly loaded from disk, the folio lock would be sufficient to prevent concurrent access. However, this overlooks a specific race condition: if another process attempts to load buddy and finds the folio is already in an uptodate state, it will immediately begin using it without holding folio lock. (CVE-2026-45942)

  - 已修复 Linux 内核中的下列漏洞：RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used. However, payload_size() subtracts both the attacker-controlled BTH pad field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt->paylen: payload_size = pkt->paylen - offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt) - RXE_ICRC_SIZE This means a short packet can still make payload_size() underflow even if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring header_size(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave payload_size() negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users. Fix this by validating pkt->paylen against the full minimum length required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE. (CVE-2026-46043)

请注意，Nessus 尚未测试这些问题，而是只依据应用程序自我报告的版本号进行判断。

Linux/Unix ホストには、ベンダーが提供するパッチが利用できない脆弱性の影響を受ける複数のパッケージがインストールされています。

  - drm/amdgpu:予約済みのドアベルを新しいキューにマッピングすることを拒否します。ユーザーキューを作成するときに、ユーザー空間がドアベル BO ハンドルと BO 内のオフセットを提供して、ドアベルを取得します。ただし、ドアベルの保存に xa_store_irq() を使用する現在の実装では、同じ BO およびオフセットパラメーターで後から作成されたキューが、既存のキューおよびドアベルのマッピングを上書きすることが可能です。これにより、IRQ 処理を間違ったキューに間違ってルーティングすることや、あるキューのクリーンアッププロセスを誤解して別のキューのマッピングを消去するなどの問題が発生することがあります。このコミットは、予約済みドアベルを新しく作成されたキューにマッピングすることを拒否する xa_insert_irq でxa_store_irqを置き換えることにより、この問題を修正します(コミット 6244eae22966350db52faf9c1369d3b2ffc5de4e からのチェリーピッキング)(CVE-2026-68103)

Nessus は、ベンダーによって報告されたパッケージの存在に依存していることに注意してください。

リモートの CentOS Linux 9 ホストに、kernel-5.14.0-756.el9 ビルド変更ログに記載されている複数の脆弱性の影響を受けるパッケージがインストールされています。

  - Linux カーネルでは、以下の脆弱性が解決されています: wifi: cfg80211: bound element ID read when checking non-inheritance cfg80211_is_element_inherited() reads the first data octet of the candidate element (id = elem->data[0]) to look it up in an extension non-inheritance list. It does so after testing elem->id, but without verifying that the element actually has a data octet. A zero-length extension element (WLAN_EID_EXTENSION with length 0) therefore makes it read one octet past the end of the element.
    _ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() runs this check for every element of a frame once a non-inheritance context exists -- e.g. while parsing a per-STA profile of a Multi-Link element in a (re)association response, or a non-transmitted BSS profile -- so a crafted frame from an AP can trigger a one-octet slab-out-of-bounds read during element parsing: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_is_element_inherited Read of size 1 ... in net/wireless/scan.c Return early (treat the element as inherited) when an extension element carries no data, mirroring the existing handling of empty ID lists. The bug was found by fuzzing ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() under KASAN. (CVE-2026-68402)

  - Linux カーネルでは、以下の脆弱性が解決されています: RDMA/siw: Reject MPA FPDU length underflow before signed receive math A malicious connected siw peer can send an iWARP FPDU whose MPA length field (c_hdr->mpa_len, 16 bit big-endian, peer-controlled) is smaller than the fixed DDP/RDMAP header for the announced opcode. Soft-iWARP parses the full header in siw_get_hdr() based on iwarp_pktinfo[opcode] .hdr_len, but never compares mpa_len against that header length. siw_tcp_rx_data() then derives srx->fpdu_part_rem = be16_to_cpu(mpa_len) - fpdu_part_rcvd + MPA_HDR_SIZE; where fpdu_part_rcvd equals iwarp_pktinfo[opcode].hdr_len at this point. For a tagged WRITE (hdr_len 16, MPA_HDR_SIZE 2) the smallest on-wire mpa_len of 0 yields fpdu_part_rem = -14, and any mpa_len below hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE underflows to a negative int. The signed value then flows into siw_proc_write()/siw_proc_rresp() as bytes = min(srx->fpdu_part_rem, srx->skb_new); is handed to siw_check_mem() as an int len (whose interval check addr + len > mem->va + mem->len is satisfied for a valid base when len is negative), and reaches siw_rx_data() -> siw_rx_kva() / siw_rx_umem() -> skb_copy_bits() as a signed copy length. The header copy branch in skb_copy_bits() promotes that to size_t, producing a multi-gigabyte read. KASAN under a KUnit harness that drives the real kernel TCP receive path -- a loopback AF_INET socketpair, the malformed FPDU written via kernel_sendmsg, sk_data_ready firing in softirq, tcp_read_sock dispatching to siw_tcp_rx_data -- reports: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_copy_bits+0x284/0x480 Read of size 4294967295 at addr ffff888... Call Trace:
    skb_copy_bits siw_rx_kva siw_rx_data siw_check_mem siw_proc_write siw_tcp_rx_data __tcp_read_sock siw_qp_llp_data_ready tcp_data_ready tcp_data_queue Add the missing invariant at the earliest point where the peer header is fully assembled. iwarp_pktinfo[*].hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE is exactly the value the siw transmitter uses as the minimum mpa_len for each opcode (drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp.c:33), so this matches the protocol contract. Out-of-range FPDUs terminate the connection with TERM_ERROR_LAYER_LLP / LLP_ETYPE_MPA / LLP_ECODE_FPDU_START -- which is RFC 5044 Section 8 error code 3 (Marker and ULPDU Length fields do not agree on the start of an FPDU), the correct framing-error class for this inconsistency.
    (CVE-2026-64102)

  - Linux カーネルでは、以下の脆弱性が解決されています: RDMA/rxe: Fix race condition in QP timer handlers I encontered the following warning: WARNING: drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_task.c:249 at rxe_sched_task+0x1c8/0x238 [rdma_rxe], CPU#0: swapper/0/0 ... libsha1 [last unloaded: ip6_udp_tunnel] CPU:
    0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G C 6.19.0-rc5-64k-v8+ #37 PREEMPT Tainted: [C]=CRAP Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.2 Call trace: rxe_sched_task+0x1c8/0x238 [rdma_rxe] (P) retransmit_timer+0x130/0x188 [rdma_rxe] call_timer_fn+0x68/0x4d0 __run_timers+0x630/0x888 ... WARNING:
    drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_task.c:38 at rxe_sched_task+0x1c0/0x238 [rdma_rxe], CPU#0: swapper/0/0 ...
    WARNING: drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_task.c:111 at do_work+0x488/0x5c8 [rdma_rxe], CPU#3:
    kworker/u17:4/93400 ... refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: lib/refcount.c:28 at refcount_warn_saturate+0x138/0x1a0, CPU#3: kworker/u17:4/93400 The issue is caused by a race condition between retransmit_timer() and rxe_destroy_qp, leading to the Queue Pair's (QP) reference count dropping to zero during timer handler execution. It seems this warning is harmless because rxe_qp_do_cleanup() will flush all pending timers and requests. Example of flow causing the issue: CPU0 CPU1 retransmit_timer() {spin_lock_irqsave rxe_destroy_qp() __rxe_cleanup() __rxe_put() // qp->ref_count decrease to 0 rxe_qp_do_cleanup() { if (qp->valid) { rxe_sched_task() { WARN_ON(rxe_read(task->qp) <= 0); } } spin_unlock_irqrestore } spin_lock_irqsave qp->valid = 0 spin_unlock_irqrestore } Ensure the QP's reference count is maintained and its validity is checked within the timer callbacks by adding calls to rxe_get(qp) and corresponding rxe_put(qp) after use. (CVE-2026-45910)

  - Linux カーネルでは、以下の脆弱性が解決されています: ext4: fix e4b bitmap inconsistency reports A bitmap inconsistency issue was observed during stress tests under mixed huge-page workloads.
    Ext4 reported multiple e4b bitmap check failures like: ext4_mb_complex_scan_group:2508: group 350, 8179 free clusters as per group info. But got 8192 blocks Analysis and experimentation confirmed that the issue is caused by a race condition between page migration and bitmap modification. Although this timing window is extremely narrow, it is still hit in practice: folio_lock ext4_mb_load_buddy __migrate_folio check ref count folio_mc_copy __filemap_get_folio folio_try_get(folio) ...... mb_mark_used ext4_mb_unload_buddy
    __folio_migrate_mapping folio_ref_freeze folio_unlock The root cause of this issue is that the fast path of load_buddy only increments the folio's reference count, which is insufficient to prevent concurrent folio migration. We observed that the folio migration process acquires the folio lock. Therefore, we can determine whether to take the fast path in load_buddy by checking the lock status. If the folio is locked, we opt for the slow path (which acquires the lock) to close this concurrency window. Additionally, this change addresses the following issues: When the DOUBLE_CHECK macro is enabled to inspect bitmap-related issues, the following error may be triggered: corruption in group 324 at byte 784(6272): f in copy != ff on disk/prealloc Analysis reveals that this is a false positive. There is a specific race window where the bitmap and the group descriptor become momentarily inconsistent, leading to this error report:
    ext4_mb_load_buddy ext4_mb_load_buddy __filemap_get_folio(create|lock) folio_lock ext4_mb_init_cache folio_mark_uptodate __filemap_get_folio(no lock) ...... mb_mark_used mb_mark_used_double mb_cmp_bitmaps mb_set_bits(e4b->bd_bitmap) folio_unlock The original logic assumed that since mb_cmp_bitmaps is called when the bitmap is newly loaded from disk, the folio lock would be sufficient to prevent concurrent access. However, this overlooks a specific race condition: if another process attempts to load buddy and finds the folio is already in an uptodate state, it will immediately begin using it without holding folio lock. (CVE-2026-45942)

  - Linux カーネルでは、以下の脆弱性が解決されています: RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used. However, payload_size() subtracts both the attacker-controlled BTH pad field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt->paylen: payload_size = pkt->paylen - offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt) - RXE_ICRC_SIZE This means a short packet can still make payload_size() underflow even if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring header_size(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave payload_size() negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users. Fix this by validating pkt->paylen against the full minimum length required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE. (CVE-2026-46043)

Nessus はこれらの問題をテストしておらず、代わりにアプリケーションが自己報告するバージョン番号にのみ依存していることに注意してください。

The Linux/Unix host has one or more packages installed that are impacted by a vulnerability without a vendor supplied patch available.

  - drm/amdgpu: reject mapping a reserved doorbell to a new queue When creating an user-queue, the user space     provides a doorbell BO handle and an offset within the bo to obtain a doorbell. However current     implementation using xa_store_irq() to store a doorbell, which allows a later queue created with the same     BO and offset parameters to overwrite an existing queue and doorbell mapping. This can cause problems like     misrouting fence IRQ processing to a wrong queue, and mislead the cleanup process of one queue erasing the     mapping of another queue. This commit fixes this issue by replacing xa_store_irq with xa_insert_irq, which     rejects mapping a reserved doorbell to a newly created queue (cherry picked from commit     6244eae22966350db52faf9c1369d3b2ffc5de4e) (CVE-2026-68103)

Note that Nessus relies on the presence of the package as reported by the vendor.

The remote CentOS Linux 9 host has packages installed that are affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the kernel-5.14.0-756.el9 build changelog.

  - In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: bound element ID read     when checking non-inheritance cfg80211_is_element_inherited() reads the first data octet of the candidate     element (id = elem->data[0]) to look it up in an extension non-inheritance list. It does so after testing     elem->id, but without verifying that the element actually has a data octet. A zero-length extension     element (WLAN_EID_EXTENSION with length 0) therefore makes it read one octet past the end of the element.
    _ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() runs this check for every element of a frame once a non-inheritance context     exists -- e.g. while parsing a per-STA profile of a Multi-Link element in a (re)association response, or a     non-transmitted BSS profile -- so a crafted frame from an AP can trigger a one-octet slab-out-of-bounds     read during element parsing: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_is_element_inherited Read of size     1 ... in net/wireless/scan.c Return early (treat the element as inherited) when an extension element     carries no data, mirroring the existing handling of empty ID lists. The bug was found by fuzzing     ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() under KASAN. (CVE-2026-68402)

  - In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/siw: Reject MPA FPDU length     underflow before signed receive math A malicious connected siw peer can send an iWARP FPDU whose MPA     length field (c_hdr->mpa_len, 16 bit big-endian, peer-controlled) is smaller than the fixed DDP/RDMAP     header for the announced opcode. Soft-iWARP parses the full header in siw_get_hdr() based on     iwarp_pktinfo[opcode] .hdr_len, but never compares mpa_len against that header length. siw_tcp_rx_data()     then derives srx->fpdu_part_rem = be16_to_cpu(mpa_len) - fpdu_part_rcvd + MPA_HDR_SIZE; where     fpdu_part_rcvd equals iwarp_pktinfo[opcode].hdr_len at this point. For a tagged WRITE (hdr_len 16,     MPA_HDR_SIZE 2) the smallest on-wire mpa_len of 0 yields fpdu_part_rem = -14, and any mpa_len below     hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE underflows to a negative int. The signed value then flows into     siw_proc_write()/siw_proc_rresp() as bytes = min(srx->fpdu_part_rem, srx->skb_new); is handed to     siw_check_mem() as an int len (whose interval check addr + len > mem->va + mem->len is satisfied for a     valid base when len is negative), and reaches siw_rx_data() -> siw_rx_kva() / siw_rx_umem() ->     skb_copy_bits() as a signed copy length. The header copy branch in skb_copy_bits() promotes that to     size_t, producing a multi-gigabyte read. KASAN under a KUnit harness that drives the real kernel TCP     receive path -- a loopback AF_INET socketpair, the malformed FPDU written via kernel_sendmsg,     sk_data_ready firing in softirq, tcp_read_sock dispatching to siw_tcp_rx_data -- reports: BUG: KASAN: use-     after-free in skb_copy_bits+0x284/0x480 Read of size 4294967295 at addr ffff888... Call Trace:
    skb_copy_bits siw_rx_kva siw_rx_data siw_check_mem siw_proc_write siw_tcp_rx_data __tcp_read_sock     siw_qp_llp_data_ready tcp_data_ready tcp_data_queue Add the missing invariant at the earliest point where     the peer header is fully assembled. iwarp_pktinfo[*].hdr_len - MPA_HDR_SIZE is exactly the value the siw     transmitter uses as the minimum mpa_len for each opcode (drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp.c:33), so this     matches the protocol contract. Out-of-range FPDUs terminate the connection with TERM_ERROR_LAYER_LLP /     LLP_ETYPE_MPA / LLP_ECODE_FPDU_START -- which is RFC 5044 Section 8 error code 3 (Marker and ULPDU Length     fields do not agree on the start of an FPDU), the correct framing-error class for this inconsistency.
    (CVE-2026-64102)

  - In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Fix race condition in QP     timer handlers I encontered the following warning: WARNING: drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_task.c:249 at     rxe_sched_task+0x1c8/0x238 [rdma_rxe], CPU#0: swapper/0/0 ... libsha1 [last unloaded: ip6_udp_tunnel] CPU:
    0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G C 6.19.0-rc5-64k-v8+ #37 PREEMPT Tainted: [C]=CRAP Hardware     name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.2 Call trace: rxe_sched_task+0x1c8/0x238 [rdma_rxe] (P)     retransmit_timer+0x130/0x188 [rdma_rxe] call_timer_fn+0x68/0x4d0 __run_timers+0x630/0x888 ... WARNING:
    drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_task.c:38 at rxe_sched_task+0x1c0/0x238 [rdma_rxe], CPU#0: swapper/0/0 ...
    WARNING: drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_task.c:111 at do_work+0x488/0x5c8 [rdma_rxe], CPU#3:
    kworker/u17:4/93400 ... refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: lib/refcount.c:28 at     refcount_warn_saturate+0x138/0x1a0, CPU#3: kworker/u17:4/93400 The issue is caused by a race condition     between retransmit_timer() and rxe_destroy_qp, leading to the Queue Pair's (QP) reference count dropping     to zero during timer handler execution. It seems this warning is harmless because rxe_qp_do_cleanup() will     flush all pending timers and requests. Example of flow causing the issue: CPU0 CPU1 retransmit_timer() {     spin_lock_irqsave rxe_destroy_qp() __rxe_cleanup() __rxe_put() // qp->ref_count decrease to 0     rxe_qp_do_cleanup() { if (qp->valid) { rxe_sched_task() { WARN_ON(rxe_read(task->qp) <= 0); } }     spin_unlock_irqrestore } spin_lock_irqsave qp->valid = 0 spin_unlock_irqrestore } Ensure the QP's     reference count is maintained and its validity is checked within the timer callbacks by adding calls to     rxe_get(qp) and corresponding rxe_put(qp) after use. (CVE-2026-45910)

  - In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix e4b bitmap inconsistency     reports A bitmap inconsistency issue was observed during stress tests under mixed huge-page workloads.
    Ext4 reported multiple e4b bitmap check failures like: ext4_mb_complex_scan_group:2508: group 350, 8179     free clusters as per group info. But got 8192 blocks Analysis and experimentation confirmed that the issue     is caused by a race condition between page migration and bitmap modification. Although this timing window     is extremely narrow, it is still hit in practice: folio_lock ext4_mb_load_buddy __migrate_folio check ref     count folio_mc_copy __filemap_get_folio folio_try_get(folio) ...... mb_mark_used ext4_mb_unload_buddy
    __folio_migrate_mapping folio_ref_freeze folio_unlock The root cause of this issue is that the fast path     of load_buddy only increments the folio's reference count, which is insufficient to prevent concurrent     folio migration. We observed that the folio migration process acquires the folio lock. Therefore, we can     determine whether to take the fast path in load_buddy by checking the lock status. If the folio is locked,     we opt for the slow path (which acquires the lock) to close this concurrency window. Additionally, this     change addresses the following issues: When the DOUBLE_CHECK macro is enabled to inspect bitmap-related     issues, the following error may be triggered: corruption in group 324 at byte 784(6272): f in copy != ff     on disk/prealloc Analysis reveals that this is a false positive. There is a specific race window where the     bitmap and the group descriptor become momentarily inconsistent, leading to this error report:
    ext4_mb_load_buddy ext4_mb_load_buddy __filemap_get_folio(create|lock) folio_lock ext4_mb_init_cache     folio_mark_uptodate __filemap_get_folio(no lock) ...... mb_mark_used mb_mark_used_double mb_cmp_bitmaps     mb_set_bits(e4b->bd_bitmap) folio_unlock The original logic assumed that since mb_cmp_bitmaps is called     when the bitmap is newly loaded from disk, the folio lock would be sufficient to prevent concurrent     access. However, this overlooks a specific race condition: if another process attempts to load buddy and     finds the folio is already in an uptodate state, it will immediately begin using it without holding folio     lock. (CVE-2026-45942)

  - In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before     payload_size() in rxe_rcv rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least     header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used. However, payload_size() subtracts both the     attacker-controlled BTH pad field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt->paylen: payload_size = pkt->paylen -     offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt) - RXE_ICRC_SIZE This means a short packet can still make payload_size()     underflow even if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring header_size(pkt) +     RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave     payload_size() negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users. Fix this by validating     pkt->paylen against the full minimum length required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) +     RXE_ICRC_SIZE. (CVE-2026-46043)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

ID	名前	製品	ファミリー	公開日	更新日	深刻度
334288	Linux Distros 未修補弱點：CVE-2026-68103	Nessus	Misc.	2026/8/10	2026/10/14	high
363461	CentOS 9：kernel-5.14.0-756.el9	Nessus	CentOS Local Security Checks	2026/10/6	2026/10/26	critical
334288	Linux Distros 未修补的漏洞：CVE-2026-68103	Nessus	Misc.	2026/8/10	2026/10/14	high
363461	CentOS 9: kernel-5.14.0-756.el9	Nessus	CentOS Local Security Checks	2026/10/6	2026/10/26	critical
334288	Linux Distros のパッチ未適用の脆弱性: CVE-2026-68103	Nessus	Misc.	2026/8/10	2026/10/14	high
363461	CentOS 9 : kernel-5.14.0-756.el9	Nessus	CentOS Local Security Checks	2026/10/6	2026/10/26	critical
334288	Linux Distros Unpatched Vulnerability : CVE-2026-68103	Nessus	Misc.	2026/8/10	2026/10/14	high
363461	CentOS 9 : kernel-5.14.0-756.el9	Nessus	CentOS Local Security Checks	2026/10/6	2026/10/26	critical

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